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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a national issue of first impression for the circuit courts,1 the 
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Louis,  held that a federally licensed 
firearm dealer who knowingly sells a firearm to a convicted felon should 
not receive additional punishment for abusing a position of public or 
private trust under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).2 Under 
Louis, a licensed firearm dealer does not occupy a position of trust as 
defined in Guidelines § 3B1.3.3 The court relied upon the limited 
discretion the victim—the federal government, as a representative of the 
people—gave to the dealer to sell firearms.4 Citing the government’s 
extensive oversight and documentation of firearm dealers, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that highly regulated firearm dealers lack discretion on 
how to exercise many aspects of their businesses.5 Therefore, the firearm 
dealer lacks a position of trust.  
The issue is narrow in scope. Because the Guidelines provide a specific 
base offense level6 for anyone who sells a firearm to a convicted felon, a 
licensed dealer and a black market dealer would receive the same 
recommended sentence if not for the imposition of the abuse of trust 
enhancement under Guidelines § 3B1.3.7 Although the result of both 
crimes is a convicted felon unlawfully possessing a firearm, licensed 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009). A Seventh Circuit 
concurring opinion previously considered the issue although counsel did not raise it on appeal. See 
United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 561–65 (7th Cir. 2008) (Ripple, J., concurring). 
 2. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 3. Id. at 1228. 
 4. Id. at 1227–28. 
 5. Id.  
 6. The “base offense level” is the starting point for a Guidelines sentence calculation. It is 
controlled by the most serious crime of conviction. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK: TEXT AND ANALYSIS 18 (West 2009–2010 ed.). 
 7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (2008) (suggesting a base 
offense level of twenty for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006), which provides, “It shall be 
unlawful for any person to sell . . . any firearm . . . to any person knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe that such person . . . (1) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court 
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[.]”). 
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dealers enjoy legal access and authority to import, manufacture, and deal in 
firearms, while unlicensed dealers lack such authority.8 Thus, due to the 
legal sanction and ease with which licensed dealers may access firearms, 
repeated licensed dealer violations present a greater threat to society. Why, 
then, does the Eleventh Circuit not hold a licensed firearm dealer, who 
enjoys the reliance of the community as a gatekeeper9 of illegal firearm 
disbursement, more accountable than an unlicensed citizen who enjoys no 
such reliance? Does such a dealer not violate public trust? 
If this issue had been presented to the Third Circuit, the outcome would 
probably differ. In a factually analogous 2009 case, United States v. 
Starnes,10 the Third Circuit subjected a subcontractor performing asbestos 
demolition to the abuse of trust enhancement for falsifying air monitoring 
reports required by the federal government.11 Instead of following the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach—which relied exclusively on the professional 
discretion the victim gave the defendant—Starnes used a hybrid approach. 
To define a position of trust, the Starnes court considered: “‘(1) whether 
the position allows the defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) 
the degree of authority which the position vests in [the] defendant vis-á-vis 
the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on 
the integrity of the person occupying the position.’”12 In its conclusion, the 
Starnes court heavily referenced the defendant’s personal authority over 
the jobsite that made the defendant’s crimes difficult to detect by the 
victim.13 However, Starnes omitted analysis of the strong oversight of 
asbestos subcontractors exercised by the federal government through the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies.14 
Therefore, the Starnes court failed to consider the key—and exclusive—
factor in determining the existence of a position of trust—the level of 
discretion the victim afforded the defendant.  
Although the courts reached different conclusions, the facts of both 
cases stood very similar.15 Because no direct individual victim existed, the 
government, as a representative of the people, was the theoretical victim of 
both crimes.16 Also, both defendants (1) specialized in vocations involving 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2006) (“No person shall engage in the business of importing, 
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition, until he has filed 
an application with and received a license to do so from the Attorney General.”). 
 9. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1227–28. 
 10. 583 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 11. Id. at 217. 
 12. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 
1994)). 
 13. Id.  
 14. See id.  
 15. Compare id. at 202–05, with United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1222–24 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 16. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1228; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 204. 
3
Griffin: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Abuse of Trust Enhancement: An
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
460 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
dangerous products;17 (2) engaged in professions subject to extensive 
oversight by the government;18 (3) knowingly violated criminal regulations 
governing their trades;19 (4) enjoyed legal access to specifically regulated 
vocations;20 and (5) exercised authoritative control, as owners, over their 
businesses.21 Despite the similarities, the Eleventh and Third Circuits 
reached opposite conclusions. 
As the above cases illustrate, courts have struggled to find a consistent 
approach to define “position of trust.” In each case, the defendant presents 
to the court specific responsibilities and duties unique to his individual 
circumstance.22 Accordingly, in deciding whether to impose the 
enhancement, courts must look beyond the defendant’s formal title.23 Thus, 
the courts must apply an approach to enhancement determination based on 
the case’s facts.24 Currently, most circuits apply the professional discretion 
approach exclusively, similar to Louis.25 However, the Second and Fourth 
Circuits join the Third Circuit and employ hybrid approaches similar to 
Starnes.26 
Although the courts remain divided on the issue, two circuit courts have 
recently refocused their attention on the commentary text of § 3B1.3 as 
amended in 1993, overruled their own precedent, and adopted the 
professional discretion approach to enhancement imposition.27 Because the 
remaining approaches rest on precedent established before the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s 1993 Amendment, the Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits should abandon their hybrid approaches and adopt the 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222 (firearms); Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203 (asbestos). 
 18. A firearm license requires dealers to comply with all state and local business laws, 18 
U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(F)(ii)(II) (2006); to maintain records on the disposition of firearms, id. 
§ 923(g)(1)(A), (3)(A); to submit to warrantless inspection, id. § 923(g)(1)(B), (C); to give prompt 
notice of theft to authorities, id. § 923(g)(6); to post the license at the business, id. § 923(h); and to 
refrain from transacting in a motor vehicle, id. § 923(j). United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 
564 (7th Cir. 2008). Similarly, the EPA sets specific work-practice standards for the handling of 
asbestos-related materials, 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.145, 61.150 (2010); and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) obligates asbestos contractors to monitor occupational exposure to 
asbestos by collecting and analyzing on-site air samples, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1101 (2010). Starnes, 
583 F.3d at 203. 
 19. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1223; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203. 
 20. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 202–03. 
 21. See Louis, 559 F.3d at 1222; Starnes, 583 F.3d at 203. 
 22. United States v. Britt, 388 F.3d 1369, 1372 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The determination of 
whether a defendant occupied a position of trust is extremely fact sensitive.”). 
 23. United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 564 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The focus is not on formal 
labels; instead, we ‘look to the relationship between the defendant and the victim and the level of 
responsibility the defendant was given.’” (quoting United States v. Snook, 366 F.3d 439, 445 (7th 
Cir. 2004))); United States v. Hernandez, 231 F.3d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 24. See Britt, 388 F.3d at 1372. 
 25. See infra notes 237–46 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 264–70 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Parts VI.A, VI.C (discussing the Ninth and Tenth Circuits).  
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professional discretion approach exclusively. 
This Note analyzes the prevalent judicial approaches to § 3B1.3 and 
explains how some courts erred by advancing the hybrid approach after the 
1993 Amendment to § 3B1.3. Part II examines the role of trust in guideline 
sentencing. Part III discusses the policy behind the Guidelines, including 
the continuing application of the Guidelines despite the Supreme Court’s 
2005 United States v. Booker28 decision. Part IV explains different 
approaches employed by the circuit courts to define a position of trust. Part 
V highlights the effect of the approach by contrasting the Third Circuit’s 
hybrid with the Eleventh Circuit’s professional discretion approach. 
Finally, Part VI analyses the history of the enhancement and endorses the 
recent trend towards the application of the professional discretion 
approach.  
II.  TRUST AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama cited a 
“deficit of trust” as the cause of many economic issues facing the nation.29 
However, because scholars and professionals often reference trust as a 
cause of business success or failure, the President’s statement about the 
role of trust in the economy was not a novel proposition to the American 
public.30  
Throughout the Guidelines, examples abound of increased base level 
offenses due to abuses of trust.31 However, strong societal disapproval of 
abusers of trust is no contemporary phenomenon.32 For example, in Dante 
Alighieri’s classic 14th Century poem The Inferno, God punishes fraud and 
treason harsher than violence and heresy.33 Dante writes of a God who 
encases flatterers, corrupt politicians, fraudulent advisors, and traitors in 
the lowest two circles of hell.34 Outrage over abuses of trust continues 
today. Perhaps the most infamous 21st Century example is the child 
                                                                                                                     
 28. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 29. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address; see also 
Richard Wolf, We Face a Deficit of Trust, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2010, at 1A. 
 30. See, e.g., John O. Whitney, The Economics of Mistrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2001) 
(“Mistrust within organizations doubles costs, diverts attention from customers, stifles innovation, 
and saps the vitality of the firm and its people.”). 
 31. See Joshua A. Kobrin, Placing Trust in the Guidelines: Methods and Meanings in the 
Application of Section 3B1.3, the Sentence Enhancement for Abusing a Position of Trust, 12 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 121, 130 (2006). 
 32. See Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social 
Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 787 (2001) (arguing that modern criminal law does 
not adequately penalize the impact of betrayal). 
 33. See Chevigny, supra note 32, at 787.  
 34. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO 147–49 (flatterers), 167–69 (corrupt politicians), 
217–23 (fraudulent advisors), 275–77 (traitors) (Allan Gilbert trans., Duke Univ. Press 1969). 
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molestation scandal that first rocked the Catholic Church in 2002.35 Other 
recent abuses of trust include disgraced Wall Street financier Bernie 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme,36 Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s pay-for-
play transactions,37 and Alaska Senator Ted Stevens’ home renovations.38  
Ironically, criminal culture also condemns any perceived abuse of trust. 
For example, the term “rat” long ago entered mainstream use to identify a 
mafia insider who came forward as a witness or cooperated with police.39 
In urban culture, the “stop snitching” campaign, a movement that threatens 
violence against informants, has acquired a nationwide foothold.40 Even 
inside police departments, fellow officers practice the “blue wall of 
silence,” a code that forbids reporting another colleague’s misconduct.41 
Additionally, trust plays a vital role in criminal sentencing. The 
criminal justice system views betrayers of trust as more culpable than other 
criminals.42 As the U.S. Sentencing Commission stated in Amendment 
66643 to the Guidelines, “the Commission’s view [is] that offenders who 
abuse their positions of public trust are inherently more culpable than those 
who seek to corrupt them, and their offenses present a somewhat greater 
threat. . . .”44 In Amendment 666 alone, the Commission increased the base 
offense level for crimes that involved offering, giving, soliciting, or 
receiving a bribe; offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving a gratuity; and 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See, e.g., Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 6, 2002, at A1; Matt Carroll et al., Geoghan Preferred Preying on Poorer Children, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 36. See Robert Frank et al., Madoff Jailed After Admitting Epic Scam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 
2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123685693449906551.html?mod=djema 
lertNEWS; see also Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?_r=1&hp. 
 37. See Jeff Coen et al., Blagojevich Arrested; Fitzgerald Calls It a ‘Political Corruption 
Crime Spree’, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-rod-
blagojevich-1209,0,7997804.story. 
 38. See Richard Mauer, Feds Eye Stevens’ Home Remodeling Project, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS (Alaska), May 29, 2007, http://www.adn.com/2007/05/29/46602/feds-eye-stevens-home-
remodeling.html. 
 39. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1884 (1993). 
 40. The “stop snitching” campaign gained national notoriety in 2004 when Denver Nuggets 
forward Carmelo Anthony appeared in a DVD produced by his childhood friends entitled Stop 
Snitching. Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN THE MAG., Jan. 
18, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296590. Although 
the creators of the DVD directed the message towards a particular West Baltimore drug kingpin who 
became an informant, police recognize that the campaign has hampered their ability to convince 
law-abiding citizens to come forward with helpful information. Id. 
 41. For a look into the code of silence within a police department, see Gabriel J. Chin & Scott 
C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to 
Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998). 
 42. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 666 (effective Nov. 1, 2004).  
 43. Amendment 666 increased the base offense level for certain public corruption offenses. 
Id. The Commission felt that “public corruption offenses previously did not receive punishment 
commensurate with the gravity of such offenses.” Id. 
 44. Id. 
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depriving the public of the intangible right to the honest services of public 
officials.45 
At bottom, all criminals abuse public trust in some manner. For 
example, when entering a convenience store, a patron trusts that he will not 
be robbed at knifepoint; when hailing a cab home in a city late at night, a 
partygoer trusts that the cab driver is charging the regulated fee. The 
Commission’s abuse of trust provisions concern not the normal 
perpetrator46 but those who commit acts that undermine an organizational 
foundation. For abuse of trust enhancements, the Commission’s paramount 
concern is with damage to an organization or society as a whole, not 
necessarily with damage to the individual directly affected by the crime.47 
For example, although a custodian who sexually abuses a child in his care 
inflicts the same level of damage to the molested child as a stranger who 
commits the same crime, the custodian also undermines the public trust of 
the custodial system. Thus, despite equal damage to the individual  when 
other perpetrators perform the same criminal acts, abusers of trust receive 
harsher penalties because they undermine the systems and vocations that 
they serve.  
III.  THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
A.  Seeking Uniformity: The Policy Behind the Guidelines 
Prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act),48 
district court judges enjoyed broad discretion over criminal penalties.49 
Growing concern over sentencing disparity amongst similar offenses 
prompted Congress to pursue reform.50 Prior to the establishment of the 
Guidelines, statutes that provided only a maximum term of years or 
monetary fine drove federal sentencing.51 As U.S. District Court Judge 
Marvin Frankel52 famously wrote in his troubling 1973 book, Criminal 
Sentences, Law Without Order or Limit, “the almost wholly unchecked and 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Id.  
 46. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 130. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–59, 3561–66, 3571–74, 3581–86 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2006)). 
 49. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993). 
 50. Id. at 228. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Judge Marvin Frankel served as a U.S. District Court Judge in the Southern District of 
New York for fifteen years. Id. at 228. Senator Edward Kennedy, credited with introducing the first 
sentencing reform bill in 1975, referred to Judge Frankel as the “‘father of sentencing reform.’” Id. 
225, 228. In the 1950s, sentencing judges began to face criticism from both sides of the political 
spectrum. Id. at 227. While critics on the left complained that (1) the rehabilitation attribute of 
sentencing punishment remained impotent; (2) indeterminacy of their sentences led prisoners to 
increased anxiety,; and (3) the disparity in sentencing stood at odds with equality ideals, critics on 
the right complained that sentencing judges and parole officers were too lenient on criminals. Id.  
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sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are 
terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of 
law.”53 These statutes left judges free to impose any sentence below the 
maximum prescribed by Congress.54  
With the passage of the Act in 1984, Congress established the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, an independent judicial agency composed of 
seven voting members and two non-voting members,55 and delegated broad 
authority to review the federal sentencing process.56 Congress sought to 
achieve the goals of (1) establishing honesty; (2) creating reasonable 
uniformity; and (3) achieving proportionality in federal sentencing.57 
However, Congress failed to adopt any concrete punishment philosophy, 
instead leaving the Commission to “reflect, to the extent practicable, 
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process[.]”58 Working with the directive codified in 28 U.S.C. § 991 
to balance the competing goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation,59 the Commission submitted its initial Guidelines to 
Congress in 1987, and after the prescribed period of congressional review, 
the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987.60  
B.  The Pre-Booker Mandatory Imposition of Guideline Sentencing 
Drawing on the need to limit sentencing disparity and, in turn, limit the 
broad discretion of district court judges, Congress required judges to 
impose sentences within the appropriate guideline ranges.61 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1)  provides:  
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within 
the range [of the applicable category of offense] unless the 
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described. In determining whether a 
                                                                                                                     
 53. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972). “The central 
purpose of this small volume is to seek the attention of literate citizens—not primarily lawyers and 
judges, but not excluding them—for gross evils and defaults in what is probably the most critical 
point in our system of administering criminal justice, the imposition of sentence.” Id. at vii.  
 54. See id. 
 55. HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 6, at 1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2008). 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 52 (1998). For an argument that retributive 
sentencing impedes meaningful reform, see Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
 60. See HAINES, JR. ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. For a concise overview of the guidelines 
sentencing process, see id. at 17–20. 
 61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983). 
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circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the 
court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy 
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing 
Commission.62 
Thus, a judge could only depart from the applicable sentencing range 
for an “aggravating or mitigating circumstance.”63 In either circumstance, 
the sentencing judge must cite a relevant fact that was not taken into 
consideration by the Guidelines, but remains consistent with the 
Commission’s sentencing policy.64 Proper reasons for an upward departure 
include the psychological impact on a victim,65 an excessive history of 
committing the same crime,66 and the vulnerability of a victim.67 Examples 
of mitigating circumstances include a defendant’s vulnerability to abuse in 
prison,68 a defendant’s withdrawal from criminal activity before arrest,69 
and assistance from a third party.70 However, in most cases, aggravating 
and mitigating departures are unavailable because the Commission 
included most relevant factors in the Guidelines.71 For example, 
premeditation is an impermissible reason for a departure because the 
Commission has already accounted for it in the Guidelines.72 Thus, in the 
vast majority of cases, the judge must impose a sentence within the 
Guideline range.73 The mandatory nature of the Guidelines led to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, which struck down 
§ 3553(b)(1) for an “advisory” regime.74 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 3742(e) also depended on “the 
Guidelines’ mandatory nature.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
 64. See id. 
 65. United States v. Lucas, 889 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding upward departure 
where bank robber forced tellers and customers to disrobe).  
 66. United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding upward departure 
where a defendant committed fourteen bank robberies and the Guidelines lacked additional 
penalties for robberies beyond five). 
 67. United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding an upward 
departure for the offense of trafficking in fraudulent credit card accounts where the defendant 
obtained the accounts in the names of hospitalized children). 
 68. United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant’s 
“immature appearance, bisexual orientation and fragility” entitled him to a downward departure). 
 69. United States v. Buchanan, 213 F.3d 302, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district 
court was obligated to consider the defendant’s withdrawal of criminal activity before his arrest). 
 70. United States v. Abercrombie, 59 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (granting 
downward departure where a third party’s assistance in an investigation was substantial and third 
party would not have assisted the government if not for the defendant’s plight). 
 71. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005). 
 72. United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1141 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that because 
premeditation is the only distinguishing factor between first and second degree murder, an upward 
departure for premeditation in a second degree murder conviction is improper). 
 73. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. 
 74. See infra Part III.C. 
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C.  Guideline Relevance After Booker 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington,75 which 
struck down Washington’s mandatory sentencing structure as a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury, some commentators, 
including Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, feared that based on the 
majority’s analysis, the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
also unconstitutional.76 Two years later, in United States v. Booker, the 
Supreme Court ended the compulsory nature of the Guidelines, striking 
down as violations of the Sixth Amendment77 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1)78 
and 3742(e),79 which dictated the mandatory implementation of the 
Guidelines.80  
The facts in Booker were abnormally egregious. The government 
charged the defendant, Freddie Booker, with possession of at least fifty 
grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.81 After a jury returned a 
guilty verdict, the Guidelines subjected Booker to a base sentence of no 
more than 262 months in prison.82 However, at a post-trial sentencing 
hearing, the district court judge found that Booker possessed an additional 
566 grams of crack.83 The judge also found Booker guilty of obstructing 
justice.84 Accordingly, Booker became subject to a new maximum sentence 
of life in prison.85 
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority in part, expressed 
particular concern that the Guidelines allowed judges to determine facts 
                                                                                                                     
 75. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 76. See id. at 325 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The structure of the Federal Guidelines 
likewise does not . . . provide any grounds for distinction. . . . If anything, the structural differences 
that do exist make the Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack.”). 
 77. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 78. Section 3553(b)(1) provides in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the 
kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
 79. Section 3742(e) provides in pertinent part: “Upon review of the record, the court of 
appeals shall determine whether the sentence . . . is outside the applicable guideline range, 
and . . . the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that . . . is not 
authorized under section 3553(b) . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) passim (2006). 
 80. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted that 
Congress settled on a mandatory-guideline system. Id. at 367. Justice Blackmun relied on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s rejection of a proposal that would have enacted the guidelines as advisory. 
Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983). 
 81. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Based on the facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker was eligible for 
a maximum sentence of 262 months. Instead, the district court judge sentenced Booker to 360 
months in prison, based on facts not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.  
10
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relevant to sentencing without a decision by a jury.86 Five years prior to 
Booker, the Court found this practice unconstitutional in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey.87 Because Congress made the Guidelines mandatory and the 
Guidelines promoted the finding of certain facts without the assistance of a 
jury, the mandatory application provisions in the Guidelines were 
unconstitutional.88 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi: “Any fact 
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence 
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of 
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”89 
According to Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the remedy opinion, 
striking §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) made the Guidelines advisory:90 “So 
modified, the federal sentencing statute . . . makes the Guidelines 
effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines 
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other 
statutory concerns as well.”91 Additionally, Booker reaffirmed that the 
circuit courts’ standard of review for sentencing decisions is a “review for 
‘unreasonable[ness].’”92 Thus, while guideline consultation remains 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 244. 
 87. 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does 
the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s 
guilty verdict?”). 
 88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
 89. Id.  
 90. In regard to the reconstruction of the statute, the Court will sometimes “sharply [bend] the 
seemingly plain meaning of a statute in order to minimize the statute’s arguable unconstitutionality.” 
Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 955 n.39 (2009). 
 91. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46 (internal citations omitted); see also Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007) (holding that sentencing judges have discretion to impose sentences 
outside the guideline ranges in cases involving conduct related to manufacture, distribution, or 
possession of crack cocaine).  
 92. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C) (1994)). The sentencing 
guidance given by the Supreme Court to the lower court is as follows:  
[T]he Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting 
information about actual district court sentencing decisions, undertaking research, 
and revising the Guidelines accordingly. . . . The district courts, while not bound 
to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account 
when sentencing. . . . The courts of appeals review sentencing decisions for 
unreasonableness. 
United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Booker, 
543 U.S. at 264). A practical understanding of “reasonable sentence,” however, provides a 
“formidable task” for the lower courts:  
[A]fter nearly twenty years of guidelines sentencing, after hundreds of judicial 
opinions construing the guidelines, after scores of scholarly articles appraising the 
supposed virtues and claimed vices of the guidelines, after the accumulation and 
evaluation of volumes of data by the Sentencing Commission, and after protracted 
deliberation by Congress, including the investment of a mountain of public 
11
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mandatory for sentencing judges, Booker prevents mandatory strict 
application of the Guidelines.93  
Recent data suggests that, since Booker, guideline adherence is slowly 
decreasing—the disparity between the mean guideline minimum and the 
average imposed sentence appears to be growing.94 For example, in the 
2004 fiscal year (pre-Booker), the median of the quarterly average sentence 
length was 50.5 months95 and the median of the quarterly average guideline 
minimum length was 59 months—a difference of 8.5 months.96 In fiscal 
year 2009 (four years after Booker), the median of the quarterly average 
sentence length was 47 months, while the mean guideline minimum length 
was 57 months—a difference of 10 months.97 Because of the recency of 
Booker, the question remains whether the disparity will continue to grow. 
However, even opponents of the Guidelines acknowledge that the 
Guideline regime, in some capacity, is here to stay.98 
IV.  PREVALENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO § 3B1.3 
Section 3B1.3 of the Guidelines provides in pertinent part: “If the 
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that 
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, 
increase by 2 levels.”99 Thus, two threshold questions determine the 
                                                                                                                     
resources, the Supreme Court abruptly disengaged the most thorough and carefully 
considered regime of criminal sentencing in history and (by the margin of one 
vote) substituted a two-word regime of criminal sentencing (perhaps the most 
abbreviated in history)—the regime of the “reasonable sentence,” now informed 
only to some indeterminate and controversial extent by the Sentencing Guidelines. 
Id. at 1364–65. 
 93. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
 94. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 2009, at 32 
fig.C, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarter  
ly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2009_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf. 
 95. See E-mail from Timothy Drisko, Research Data Coordinator, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
to author (Jan. 27, 2011, 12:45 PM EST) (on file with author). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id.  
 98. Evangeline A. Zimmerman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Misplaced Trust in 
Mechanical Justice, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 841, 867 (2010) (citing José A. Cabranes, The U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go From Here?, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 208, 208 (2000) 
(“There is a well-nigh universal agreement that the general outlines of the current system are here to 
stay. . . . The Guidelines have become deeply entrenched.”)). 
 99. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010). The entire section reads as 
follows: 
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, 
in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the 
offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of 
trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic. 
If this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a position of trust, it may be employed 
in addition to an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role); if this adjustment 
12
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application of the abuse of trust enhancement.100 First, whether the 
defendant held a position of public or private trust.101 If so, whether the 
position of trust “significantly facilitate[d]” commission or concealment of 
the offense.102  
Courts find the answer to the second question easier than the first. As 
§ 3B1.3 Application Note One describes, a nexus must exist between the 
position of trust and the facilitation of the crime: “For this adjustment to 
apply, the position of public or private trust must have contributed in some 
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the 
offense (e.g., by making the detection of the offense or the defendant’s 
responsibility for the offense more difficult).”103 
In other words, the crime’s execution must benefit significantly from 
the defendant’s position of trust. So long as the defendant used the position 
of trust to further execute the crime, whether the defendant could have 
executed the crime without the benefit of the trust position is irrelevant.104 
For example, a court will probably withhold the enhancement for a 
supervisor of elections convicted of a drug offense. However, a court will 
                                                                                                                     
is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be employed in addition to 
an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role). 
Id. Courts apply the “special skill” enhancement distinct from the abuse of trust enhancement. See 
id. The special skill enhancement rests outside the scope of this Note. 
 100. See id.; United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in 
part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge 
panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled). 
 101. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010); Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1165–
66. 
 102. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2010); Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1165–
66.  
 103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt n.1 (2010). Application Note One 
reads in its entirety as follows: 
“Public or private trust” refers to a position of public or private trust characterized 
by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment 
that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions 
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose 
responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature. For this adjustment to 
apply, the position of public or private trust must have contributed in some 
significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense (e.g., 
by making the detection of the offense or the defendant’s responsibility for the 
offense more difficult). This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an 
embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank 
executive’s fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a 
physician under the guise of an examination. This adjustment does not apply in the 
case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk because 
such positions are not characterized by the above-described factors. 
Id. 
 104. United States v. Andrews, 484 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] position of trust 
significantly facilitates a crime when it makes the crime either easier to commit or more difficult for 
others to detect.”). 
13
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likely apply the enhancement if the supervisor of elections commits a voter 
fraud offense.105  
Although most “significant facilitation” questions lack such simplicity, 
the questions are better settled than their counterparts. Answers to whether 
the defendant occupied a position of public or private trust fluctuate 
between circuits and even among courts within the same circuit.106 No 
consistent judicial clarification to this question has existed since the 
establishment of the Guidelines.107  
The Commission provides the definition of “public or private trust” in 
Application Note One of § 3B1.3: “‘Public or private trust’ refers to a 
position of public or private trust characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding such positions 
ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees 
whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature.”108 
At a minimum, the position of trust must stem from the defendant’s 
relationship with the victim.109 That is, the victim must actively confer 
trust upon the defendant, and the defendant must violate that trust.110 In the 
“position of trust” realm, this seems to be the only statement in which 
courts agree. Traditionally, courts use a number of approaches to decide 
whether an individual occupies a position of trust.111 However, three 
distinct approaches most frequently form the case law: (1) access and 
authority; (2) difficult-to-detect; and (3) professional discretion.112 Many 
courts employ combinations, or hybrids, of these three approaches and 
others.113 
                                                                                                                     
 105. See United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 106. See, e.g., infra note 119. 
 107. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 132. 
 108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2010). For the full text of 
Application Note 1, see supra note 103. 
 109. United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 564 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. 
Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 110. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564; see also Hathcoat, 30 F.3d at 919. 
 111. Some of the factors include:  
(1) the defendant’s freedom to commit an easily concealed wrong, (2) whether an 
abuse of the position can be readily detected, (3) duties of the position relative to 
other employees, (4) level of specialized knowledge required for the job, (5) the 
position’s authority, and (6) the level of trust placed in the position by the public. 
Brian Hendricks, Note, In Pursuit of Environmental Regulatory Compliance: Should We Flex the 
“Public Trust” Enhancement Muscle?, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 169 
(2005). 
 112. See Kobrin, supra note 31, at 131–49. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[F]actors include: (1) whether the defendant had 
either special duties or ‘“special access to information not available to other employees’”; (2) the 
extent of discretion defendant possesses; (3)[ ]whether the defendant’s acts indicate that he is 
‘“more culpable” than others’ who are in positions similar to his and who engage in criminal acts; 
14
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A.  Access and Authority 
Under the access and authority approach, the application of § 3B1.3 
relies on the amount of access an employee has to the actions or items that 
led to the law breaking.114 The relevant question is “whether trust is 
inherent to the nature of the position.”115 The theory behind the access and 
authority approach is that, if significant authority and access authority are 
given to an employee, then the employee is exercising significant 
“professional or managerial discretion”116 even though the employee may 
not serve directly as a manager.117 Therefore, such an employee would be 
subject to the enhancement for abusing a position of trust.  
The Commission arguably provides support for the access and authority 
approach in the definition of public or private trust: “Persons holding such 
positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in 
nature.”118 Although confusion reigns as to whether the access and 
authority approach is sufficient, by itself, to implicate an abuse of public 
trust,119 the Third,120 Fourth,121 and Seventh Circuits122 list access and 
authority as factors in their determinations. 
B.  Difficult-to-Detect 
The difficult-to-detect approach originated from the Ninth Circuit’s 
United States v. Hill123 decision. In Hill, the defendant—an employee-
                                                                                                                     
and (4) viewing the entire question of abuse of trust from victim’s perspective.” (quoting United 
States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting that courts must consider, “(1) [W]hether the position allows the defendant 
to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the position vests in [the] 
defendant vis-a-vis [sic] the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on 
the integrity of the person occupying the position.”); United States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555, 557 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
 114. United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 115. United States v. Brelsford, 982 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1992) (non-managerial, 
postal carriers). 
 118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008). But see infra text 
accompanying notes 252–56. 
 119. Compare United States v. Dorsey, 27 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[Position of trust] 
is characterized by ‘access or authority over valuable things.’ Of course, access or authority alone is 
not sufficient.” (internal citation omitted)), with United States v. Frykholm, 267 F.3d 604, 612 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“[Position of trust enhancement] turns upon whether [the defendant] had ‘access or 
authority over . . . valuable things.’”). 
 120. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 217 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 121. United States v. Pitts, 176 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 122. Dorsey, 27 F.3d at 289. 
 123. 915 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 
1163, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny 
should be overruled). 
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driver for a national moving company—picked up furniture and household 
goods for five military families who were relocating to Germany from 
Missouri and Kansas.124 Instead of delivering the belongings to the Texas 
routing point, Hill sold several of the items to various individuals around 
Licking, Missouri.125 After a grand jury indictment and a guilty plea of 
theft of an interstate shipment, the district court judge adjusted Hill’s base 
offense level upward under § 3B1.3.126 Hill appealed the enhancement, 
contending that the relationship between a truck driver and the owner of 
the truck’s cargo does not give rise to a position of trust, especially because 
he was merely a company employee and not specifically sought out by the 
victims.127 
In holding that the enhancement was proper, the Ninth Circuit gave 
birth to the “difficult-to-detect” approach: “[T]he primary trait that 
distinguishes a person in a position of trust from one who is not is the 
extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-
detect wrong.”128 The definition relies on (1) the victim’s objective ability 
to determine the defendant’s honesty; and (2) the extent to which the 
defendant’s activities can be easily observed.129 While the court found that 
the families maintained an objective ability to determine Hill’s honesty 
because they could compare the truck’s contents at the destination to its 
contents prior to leaving the home, the families could not expediently 
discover Hill’s activities because at the time of inspection, they would have 
been in Germany.130 
Thus, the theory behind the difficult-to-detect approach is that if a party 
has the ability to take criminal advantage of another without quick 
detection, then the party has established a position of trust.131 For nineteen 
years, Hill reigned as the leading case for the difficult-to-detect approach 
as well as the entire abuse of trust enhancement.132 Currently, the hybrid 
approaches of the Second,133 Third,134 and Fourth Circuits135 still employ 
elements of Hill’s difficult-to-detect approach. 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 504–05. 
 128. Id. at 506. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 506–07. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2009) (overruling Hill), 
vacated in part by 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original 
three-judge panel that ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled). 
 133. United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 134. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 217 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 135. United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 1995). 
16
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C.  Professional Discretion 
Under the professional discretion approach, the decisive factor is the 
amount of managerial or professional discretion vested in the defendant by 
the victim.136 The 1993 Amendment to § 3B1.3 provides direct, textual 
authority for the professional discretion approach:137 “‘Public or private 
trust’ refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary 
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding 
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in 
nature.”138 
Often, professional or managerial discretion manifests itself in a 
position requiring substantial training.139 One occupying such a position is 
given considerable deference because victims often do not understand the 
technical details of the position.140 Fiduciary relationships such as doctor-
patient or lawyer-client easily fit this description.141 Additionally, 
substantial discretionary judgment arises in relationships characterized by 
an imbalance in power, such as guardian-ward relationships.142   
On the other side of the spectrum, positions subject to extensive 
oversight lack substantial discretionary judgment.143 An ordinary bank 
teller provides an example of a position not ordinarily subject to the 
enhancement.144 Although a bank teller may sometimes have the freedom 
to act without detection, such a position lacks considerable deference: 
An ordinary teller has no discretion with regard to his 
dealings with the deposit; he is required by his position to 
place it in the till. There is no element of discretionary 
judgment in his position that would permit him to explain 
properly the absence of that deposit in his till at the end of the 
day.145 
In contrast, a patient entrusts his doctor with significant discretion, and 
“as a result of that discretion, [the doctor] has substantial opportunity to 
                                                                                                                     
 136. United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tribble, 
206 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 137. United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 139. See United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) (Ripple, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Lessons 
from Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025 (2002) (analyzing the role of fiduciary law in the 
Guidelines). 
 142. See Fairfax, supra note 141, at 1035. 
 143. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008).  
 145. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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offer explanations for his criminal conduct . . . .”146 Thus, to occupy a 
position of trust under the professional discretion approach, opportunity to 
commit the crime must arise not only through difficult detection or broad 
access but must also arise as a result of substantial discretionary 
judgment.147 
Cases such as Louis and Starnes, in which defendants own and operate 
their own businesses subject to extensive government regulation, create 
more difficult decisions for sentencing courts.148 On one hand, as the 
owner of his own business, the defendant is subject to no managerial 
oversight over daily operations. On the other hand, federal laws place strict 
requirements on the operation of the business.149 In such cases, critical 
evaluation of the victim’s specific relationship with the defendant often 
informs the final determination.150 Thus, courts should evaluate whether a 
defendant’s criminal opportunity arose as a result of substantial 
discretionary judgment given by the victim.151  
Although all circuit courts currently apply professional discretion as at 
least one factor in their determination, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits employ the professional 
discretion approach exclusively.152 
D.  Specific Abuse of Trust Enhancements 
Currently, Application Note Two provides two specific situations in 
which a court must apply the enhancement.153 In other words, despite the 
applicable circuit court’s interpretation of position of trust, if a sentencing 
judge is faced with a defendant who qualifies under either situation, the 
judge must apply the enhancement.154 The enhancement specifically 
applies to “[a]n employee of the United States Postal Service who engages 
in the theft or destruction of undelivered United States mail” and to “[a] 
defendant who exceeds or abuses the authority of his or her position in 
order to obtain unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of 
identification.”155The Commission initially included the postal service 
employee enhancement in the 1993 Amendment to the Guidelines.156 The 
Commission’s official “Reason for Amendment” reads, “This amendment 
reformulates the definition of an abuse of position of trust to better 
distinguish cases warranting this enhancement.”157 Although no longer 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 565 (emphasis omitted). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See infra Part V.B–C. 
 149. See infra Part V.D. 
 150. See infra Part V.D. 
 151. See Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 152. See infra notes 238–46 and accompanying text. 
 153. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2008). 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 2003). 
 157. Id. 
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included in Application Note Two, the amendment instructed that the 
Commission insert the language “because of the special nature of the 
United States mail.”158 Seemingly, the Commission promulgated the 
amendment to resolve a dispute between the courts as to whether low-level 
postal employees occupied a position of trust.159  
The Commission’s second automatic enhancement, “means of 
identification,” resulted from a Congressional mandate in the Identity Theft 
Penalty Enhancement Act (Identity Theft Act).160 The Identity Theft Act 
created two new criminal offenses for aggravated identity theft, which 
“prohibits the unauthorized transfer, use, or possession of a means of 
identification of another person during, or in relation to, specific 
enumerated felonies.”161 The Identity Theft Act called on the Commission 
to “review and amend its guidelines and its policy statements to ensure that 
the guideline offense levels and enhancements appropriately punish 
identity theft offenses involving an abuse of position.”162 Additionally, 
Congress specifically included a reference to § 3B1.3 for offenders who 
abuse their position of trust to obtain or use an unlawful identification.163 
The Commission responded with Application Note Two, which mandates 
application of the abuse of trust enhancement if a defendant “exceeds or 
abuses the authority of his or her position to obtain, transfer, or issue 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. 
 159. Compare United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that a postal 
letter carrier’s access to valuable mail was a direct result of his position and holding that he 
occupied a position of trust), and United States v. Milligan, 958 F.2d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting an argument that a postal position was the same as an ordinary bank clerk and applying 
§ 3B1.3), with United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing sentence 
enhancement for a postal window clerk), and United States v. Cuff, 999 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam) (“[W]e fail to see any significant distinction between the bank teller who 
embezzles funds and Cuff, who stole mail packages while employed in unloading them and moving 
them into the workroom where other employees were located.”). 
 160. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No.108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004); see 
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 677 (2008). 
 161. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 677 (2008). The first offense 
created was an aggravated identity theft provision for those who used a false identification to carry 
out certain enumerated offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)(a)(1) (2006). The second offense was aimed 
specifically at terrorism:  
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in section 
2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, 
a means of identification of another person or a false identification document 
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of 5 years. 
Id. § 1028A(a)(2). 
 162. § 5(a), 118 Stat. at 833. 
 163. § 5(b)(1), 118 Stat. at 833 (requiring the Commission to “Amend [Guidelines] section 
3B1.3 . . . to apply to and punish offenses in which the defendant exceeds or abuses the authority of 
his or her position in order to obtain unlawfully or use without authority any means of 
identification . . . .”). 
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unlawfully, or use without authority, any means of identification.”164 The 
automatic enhancements are significant because they signal the willingness 
of both Congress and the Commission to legislate or promulgate a more 
specific approach to § 3B1.3 sentencing, if necessary. Thus, either body 
could legislate or promulgate specific exceptions for federally licensed 
firearm dealers or asbestos subcontractors. 
V.  WHY THE APPROACH MATTERS: RECENT ABUSE OF TRUST 
DECISIONS 
Recent circuit opinions highlight the importance of the approach to the 
enhancement’s application. As discussed above, because of the differences 
in approach, circuit courts are not applying the enhancement consistently to 
similar facts.  Thus, defendants receive different sentences based merely 
upon jurisdiction. The following cases demonstrate recent examples. 
A.  United States v. Podhorn Concurrence: The Professional 
Discretion Approach Prevents § 3B1.3 Enhancement for a 
Licensed Firearm Dealer 
In United States v. Podhorn,165 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) obtained a search warrant for the business 
premises of Paul Podhorn, a federally licensed firearm dealer.166 Pursuant 
to the discoveries of the search, a jury convicted Podhorn of two counts of 
selling stolen firearms, twenty-one counts of selling firearms without 
maintaining proper records, and one count of failing to maintain proper 
firearm records.167 Because Podhorn’s counsel failed to challenge the abuse 
of trust enhancement on appeal, the majority decision did not address it.168 
However, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, chose to specifically address whether a federally licensed firearm 
dealer occupies a position of trust.169  
Citing Seventh Circuit precedent,170 Judge Ripple reasoned that the 
imposition of § 3B1.3 is appropriate only if the victim places the offender 
in a position of professional or managerial discretion, a position with the 
type of substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference, and the offender abuses that discretion to carry out 
the offense.171 According to this reasoning, the government was Podhorn’s 
                                                                                                                     
 164. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2008). 
 165. 549 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 166. Id. at 555. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 562 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Mr. Podhorn has not 
contended that [a Federal Firearms License] is not a position of either public or private trust. An 
argument not made on appeal is abandoned, and we need not consider it.” (citing United States v. 
Venters, 539 F.3d 801, 809 (7th Cir. 2008))). 
 169. Id. at 563. 
 170. Id. at 563–64 (citing United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 171. Id. 
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victim.172 Thus, in order to hold a position of trust, the government must 
have placed the Federal Firearm License (FFL) holder, the defendant, in “a 
position characterized by professional or managerial discretion.”173 
Alternatively stated, the government must give the FFL holder a “position 
with the type of substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference.”174 
However, as Judge Ripple noted, the government provides an FFL 
holder with very little discretionary power.175 Instead, the government 
subjects an FFL holder to an extensive list of legal requirements, such as 
complying with all firearms regulations of federal, state, and local law; 
maintaining records of every disposition of every firearm; subjecting the 
premises to inspection without reasonable cause or warrant; and reporting a 
lost or stolen firearm to local authorities within forty-eight hours.176 
Further, Judge Ripple compared an FFL holder who steals a firearm sent to 
him for repair to “an ordinary bank teller”177 who steals a customer’s 
deposit instead of placing it in the till.178 In the case of the bank teller, the 
teller holds no element of discretionary judgment that would allow him to 
properly explain the absence of the deposit.179 Similarly, the FFL holder 
maintains no discretionary judgment that would allow him to properly 
explain the absence of the firearm.180 Finally, Judge Ripple compared the 
FFL to a driver’s license; even though a driver’s license gives its holder the 
opportunity to commit offenses, the government does not give a driver 
“substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable 
deference” just by issuing a driver’s license.181 Instead, a driver’s license 
holder subjects himself to extensive government oversight and, therefore, 
lacks a position of trust.182 
In sum, Judge Ripple’s concurrence in Podhorn provides a thoughtful 
example of a professional discretion approach to § 3B1.3 determinations. 
Had Judge Ripple applied a tri-part access and authority, difficult-to-detect, 
and professional discretion hybrid, the outcome may have been different.183 
A few months later, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Judge Ripple’s 
concurrence.184 
 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 564. 
 173. See id. at 563. 
 174. See id. at 563–64. 
 175. Id. at 564. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Application Note One explicitly notes that an “ordinary bank teller” does not occupy a 
position of trust. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2008). 
 178. Podhorn, 549 F.3d at 564–65 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 179. Id. at 565. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 563, 565. 
 182. See id. at 565. 
 183. See infra Part V.D (discussing the application of different “public trust” tests to the 
similar fact patterns set out in Louis and Starnes).   
 184. See infra Part V.B. 
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B.  United States v. Louis: The Eleventh Circuit Uses the 
    Professional Discretion Approach to Prevent § 3B1.3  
Enhancement for a Licensed Firearm Dealer 
In United States v. Louis, the ATF, using a paid informant, attempted to 
purchase a firearm from the defendant, a licensed firearms dealer.185 After 
meeting in a used car lot, the informant, a convicted felon, notified the 
dealer of his criminal past.186 The dealer asked the informant if a non-felon 
could complete the required paperwork on the informant’s behalf.187 Days 
later, the informant returned with an undercover agent, who completed the 
paperwork. The dealer gave the informant a firearm.188 A month later, the 
ATF again arranged for a paid informant to visit the dealer.189 This time, 
the informant arrived with an undercover agent.190 When the informant 
told the dealer of his criminal history, the dealer asked the undercover 
agent to complete the paperwork.191 After completion, the dealer gave the 
informant a firearm.192 
After a jury conviction for two counts of selling a firearm to a convicted 
felon, the presentence report recommended increasing the dealer’s offense 
level two points based on § 3B1.3 for abusing a position of trust.193 
Applying the presentence report’s suggestion, the sentencing judge wrote:  
“[T]he public trust, in part, is that the person who is duly 
licensed and empowered by the government to sell weapons 
will not sell them in a manner, because they are dangerous 
instrumentalities, that they will cause or are likely to cause 
further harm in society, because they’re put in the hands of 
people who have already shown that they cannot comply with 
the rules and laws of society.”194 
Further, the district court noted that “the public ‘trusted’ [the dealer] ‘to 
be the first line of defense in preventing criminals from accessing 
dangerous weapons.’”195 The judge sentenced the dealer to twenty-seven 
months in prison and two years of supervised release,196 a noticeable 
increase in the basic charge due to sentence enhancements.197  On appeal, 
                                                                                                                     
 185. United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1223. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (alteration in original). 
 195. Id. at 1228. 
 196. Id. at 1223. 
 197. The base offense level was fourteen. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2K2.1(a)(6)(B) (2009). The Guidelines call for an upward enhancement of two points because the 
dealer agreed to sell the first informant five additional firearms. See id. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(B), (b)(1)(A). 
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the Eleventh Circuit reversed the public trust decision.198 Relying on Judge 
Ripple’s concurrence in United States v. Podhorn, Judge William Pryor 
concluded that “[b]ecause . . . dealers are closely regulated and do not 
exercise the substantial discretion necessary for a position of public trust, 
we hold that those licensees are not subject to the abuse-of-trust 
enhancement.”199 The Eleventh Circuit flatly rejected the “first line of 
defense” reasoning and noted the district court’s lack of analysis about the 
discretion exercised by firearm dealers.200 Applied to its end, the district 
court’s reasoning would subject nearly all convicted defendants to 
§ 3B1.3’s enhancement because for every crime, the public, in some way, 
trusts one who commits the crime.  
Again relying on Podhorn, the court reasoned that, to occupy a position 
of trust, three factors should be considered: professional judgment, 
discretion, and deference.201 While FFL holders exercise a significant 
amount of social responsibility, social responsibility does not imply 
professional discretion.202 The court also rejected the government’s 
argument that because Louis was unsupervised, Louis received substantial 
deference.203 In doing so, the court highlighted the periodic inspection that 
immediately proceeded Louis’s arrest: “[W]ere it not for this close 
regulation and supervision, Louis’s crime would likely have gone 
undetected.”204 Given the longer history of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
application of the professional discretion approach,205 the Louis decision 
comes as less of a surprise than the Podhorn concurrence. 
C.  United States v. Starnes: The Third Circuit Applies a Hybrid 
Approach to Impose § 3B1.3 Enhancement to an Asbestos  
Removal Subcontractor 
In United States v. Starnes,206 a factually analogous case to Louis and 
Podhorn, the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion by finding that 
an asbestos removal subcontractor occupies a position of trust.207 Starnes, 
the owner of a demolition company, subcontracted under the Virgin Islands 
Housing Authority (VIHA) to conduct asbestos-related demolition.208 The 
project specifications provided that subcontractors were to perform all 
                                                                                                                     
Plus, another upward enhancement of two points derived from the dealer abusing a position of trust. 
See id. § 3B1.3. As a result, the new offense level was eighteen.  
 198. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1225. 
 199. Id. at 1222. 
 200. Id. at 1228. 
 201. Id. at 1227. 
 202. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2009). 
 203. Louis, 559 F.3d at 1228. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 122 F.3d 1360, 1365–66 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 206. 583 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 207. Id. at 217 (“[W]e conclude that the District Court correctly determined that Starnes was in 
a position of trust.”). 
 208. Id. at 202. 
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work in strict accordance with all federal, state, and local regulations.209 As 
a former asbestos demolition course instructor, Starnes understood the 
asbestos abatement procedures and regulations.210 During the first month 
of the project, Starnes fell two weeks behind on the VIHA’s mandatory 
daily air-monitoring reports.211 In response, VIHA sent Starnes a 
noncompliance notice.212 The following day, VIHA received twelve signed 
air-monitoring reports from Starnes, attesting that he analyzed the daily air 
samples at the site.213 A week later, an air quality specialist with the Virgin 
Islands Department of Planning and Natural Resources (DPNR) visited the 
site and noted deplorable conditions, including workers covered in white 
powder and visible emissions rising from asbestos-laden ceiling tiles.214 
DPNR issued a stop work order and referred the matter to the EPA.215 
After an EPA investigation that revealed falsified air-monitoring reports, a 
jury convicted Starnes under the Clean Air Act with three counts of 
knowingly violating EPA standards for the handling of regulated asbestos 
and twelve counts of falsifying air-monitoring reports.216 
 On appeal, Starnes contended that the district court erred by finding that 
he occupied a position of trust under § 3B1.3.217 Upholding the decision of 
the district court, the court explained the Third Circuit’s position of trust 
approach as follows: 
In deciding whether a defendant holds a position of trust, a 
court must consider: “(1) whether the position allows the 
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the 
degree of authority which the position vests in [the] defendant 
vis-á-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
has been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the 
position.”218 
First, the court noted that, as the owner of the company, Starnes was 
subject to very little supervision and therefore held substantial “managerial 
discretion.”219 Accordingly, this discretion facilitated Starnes’s crimes and 
made them “difficult-to-detect.”220 Second, the court concluded that in that 
same role, Starnes held “significant authority” over the work at the jobsite, 
including authority over air monitoring.221 Finally, the court noted that 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 203. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 204–05. 
 217. Id. at 217. 
 218. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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VIHA relied on Starnes to accurately report the levels of asbestos at the 
jobsite.222 Thus, the Third Circuit imposed the enhancement.223 
D.  Comparing Louis and Starnes 
Although the Starnes opinion lacks an exhaustive analysis of the issue, 
it highlights some key differences between the approaches of the Third and 
Eleventh Circuits. As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, the facts of 
Starnes and Louis are strikingly similar.224 Therefore, if the Third Circuit 
faced the facts presented in Louis, the court would probably have applied 
the enhancement. First, Louis, just like Starnes, owned and operated his 
business and, therefore, was subject to no direct supervision. Therefore, 
Louis maintained “managerial discretion,” and this discretion made Louis’s 
illegal sales difficult to detect. In fact, Louis’s dealings may have been 
more inconspicuous than Starnes’s dealings. Although Starnes was 
required to submit air-monitoring reports to the DPNR, VIHA, and EPA, 
Louis needed to submit documents to the ATF only. Second, Louis, as a 
sole proprietor and firearm dealer, held “significant authority” over the 
business, including the choice of whether to sell a firearm to a felon. Third, 
just like the VIHA “relied on” Louis to make accurate air-monitoring 
reports, the ATF, the federal government, and society-at-large relied on 
Louis to be a “gatekeeper” of dangerous firearms. 
Conversely, if the Eleventh Circuit faced the facts presented in Starnes, 
the court would probably not apply the § 3B1.3 enhancement. Under the 
Louis rationale, the Eleventh Circuit evaluates the enhancement based on 
professional judgment, discretion, and deference from the perspective of 
the victim. Under the Starnes facts, the government, as a representative of 
the people, is the victim of fraudulent air-monitoring reports. Although the 
government allowed Starnes to exercise significant professional judgment 
as the owner of his business, the government allowed Starnes little 
discretion or deference in regard to asbestos air monitoring. Instead, the 
EPA set specific work-practice standards for the handling of asbestos-
related materials and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) obligated asbestos contractors to monitor jobsite air samples. 
Additionally, the asbestos air-monitoring reports were subject to oversight 
by four government agencies: DPNR, EPA, OSHA, and VIHA. Hence, the 
lack of professional discretion given by the government to Starnes likely 
fails to implicate Starnes under the Eleventh Circuit’s § 3B1.3 
enhancement approach. 
VI.  PROGRESSING TOWARD DISCRETION: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE 
PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION APPROACH 
Since the enactment of the Guidelines twenty years ago, courts have 
struggled to find a consistent definition for a position of trust under 
                                                                                                                     
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 15–21. 
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§ 3B1.3. As Starnes and Louis demonstrate, the application of different 
approaches often leads to different results.225 In light of the recent United 
States v. Contreras226 decision and the plain text of Application Note One 
as amended in 1993, the remaining courts should adopt the professional 
discretion approach exclusively. 
A.  United States v. Contreras: The Ninth Circuit Rejects the 
Difficult-to-Detect Approach 
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit explicitly overruled United States v. Hill, the 
genesis of the difficult-to-detect approach.227 In United States v. Contreras, 
the defendant, a cook at a California state prison, pled guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance.228 
Before the defendant entered the prison each day, prison officials 
administered a cursory search of her person.229 At work, Contreras had 
unmonitored contact with prisoners in the kitchen.230 Relying on these 
liberties, Contreras used tea cans inside her lunch box to smuggle drugs 
into the prison.231 Pursuant to the recommendation of the presentencing 
report, the sentencing court included a two level enhancement for violating 
a position of trust under § 3B1.3.232 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit pointed to 
the text of § 3B1.3’s Application Note One, the 1993 guideline 
amendments, and the resulting confusion in its own case law, and 
concluded that the Hill difficult-to-detect approach should never have 
survived the 1993 amendments.233 
Prior to the 1993 amendments, § 3B1.3’s Application Note One read 
that the position “must have contributed in some substantial way to 
facilitating the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that 
could as easily have been afforded to other persons.”234 However, in 1993, 
in order to “better distinguish cases warranting this enhancement,”235 the 
Commission amended Application Note One to read: “‘Public or private 
trust’ refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary 
judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). Persons holding 
such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in 
nature.”236 
                                                                                                                     
 225. See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text. 
 226. 581 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 227. Id. at 1164. 
 228. Id. at 1164–65. 
 229. Id. at 1164. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1165.  
 233. Id. at 1165–66. 
 234. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990). 
 235. Id. at app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 1993). 
 236. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Drawing on the text of the amendment and reasoning from other circuit 
courts, the Ninth Circuit struck down the difficult-to-detect approach that it 
had created and followed for nearly twenty years: “Whereas Hill assessed 
whether a defendant had the ‘freedom’ to commit a crime without ‘quick 
notice,’ the commentary instead emphasizes ‘professional or managerial 
discretion.’”237 The court also noted the evident confusion in its case law 
since 1993 as it attempted to reconcile the difficult-to-detect approach with 
the amendment’s professional discretion approach: “Continued use of the 
Hill test after 1993 has swept up bank tellers, post office clerks, and supply 
officers in the enhancement—though none held a position of ‘professional 
or managerial discretion.’”238 With Contreras, the Ninth Circuit joined the 
First,239 Sixth,240 Eighth,241 Tenth,242 Eleventh,243 and District of Columbia 
Circuits244 in applying the professional discretion approach exclusively.245 
While Contreras is binding only in the Ninth Circuit, it has nationwide 
significance. First, it overrules Hill, which stood for nearly twenty years as 
the leading case for defining a position of trust. Second, Hill created the 
difficult-to-detect approach that other circuit courts subsequently employed 
in their opinions.246 Thus, Contreras calls much of the § 3B1.3 position of 
trust jurisprudence into serious question. 
B.  The Plain Text of the Commission’s 1993 Amendment to 
Application Note One  
With the enactment of the Guidelines in 1990, Congress and the 
Commission gave little guidance to the courts on how to define a position 
of trust under § 3B1.3.247 The position only needed to “have contributed in 
some substantial way to facilitating the crime and not merely have 
provided an opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other 
persons.”248 The Commission’s broad definition understandably led to 
varying approaches and outcomes amongst the circuit courts.249 Out of 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Contreras, 581 F.3d at 1166 (internal citation omitted). 
 238. Id. at 1167. 
 239. See United States v. Reccko, 151 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 240. See United States v. Tribble, 206 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 241. See United States v. Trice, 245 F.3d 1041, 1042 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 242. See United States v. Spear, 491 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 243. See United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 244. United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 245. United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part by 593 
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that 
ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled). 
 246. See supra Part IV.B. 
 247. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990). The Guidelines 
commentary binds the courts unless it violates federal law, is inconsistent with the Guidelines 
themselves, or is based upon a plainly erroneous reading of a guideline provision. See Stinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1993). 
 248. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (1990).  
 249. See Hendricks, supra note 111, at 176. 
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§ 3B1.3’s original definition, today’s three most popular approaches were 
born.250 
However, in 1993, the Commission amended Application Note One to 
emphasize professional or managerial discretion: “‘Public or private trust’ 
refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by professional 
or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference).”251 Recognizing the gross 
inconsistencies between circuits in 1993, the Commission sought to 
“reformulate[] the definition of an abuse of position of trust to better 
distinguish cases warranting [the § 3B1.3] enhancement.”252 Accordingly, 
the Application Note explicitly mentions “professional or managerial 
discretion” and intentionally omits explicit mention of “access and 
authority” or “difficult-to-detect,” despite the latter standards’ existence at 
the time.253 Of the many approaches available in 1993,254 the Commission 
chose to mention only “professional or managerial discretion” in the 
Amendment.255 Thus, in its 1993 Amendment, the Commission implicitly 
approved of the professional discretion approach to § 3B1.3 enhancements. 
As noted in Contreras, despite the text’s plain meaning, many courts 
continued to adhere to their previous approaches “without addressing or 
analyzing the change in the law.”256 Contreras admonished courts in the 
Ninth Circuit because instead of addressing the difficult-to-detect approach 
in 1993, many courts failed to analyze the effect of the amended 
commentary and to acknowledge that the difficult-to-detect approach 
preceded the amendments.257 Thus, the Ninth Circuit essentially ignored 
the 1993 Amendment for sixteen years until its Contreras decision adopted 
the professional discretion approach.258 
C.  The Faulty Legal Grounding of the Hybrid Approach 
In 2007, in United States v. Spear,259 the Tenth Circuit rejected its 
hybrid approach along with a § 3B1.3 enhancement for a federal 
immigration official convicted of embezzling government funds.260 
Significantly, in its adoption of the professional discretion approach, the 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See supra Part IV. 
 251. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 252. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 492 (effective Nov. 1, 1993). 
 253. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2007). 
 254. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1992) (employing 
hybrid approach); United States v. Brelsford, 982 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1992) (employing the 
access and authority approach); United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990) (employing 
the difficult-to-detect approach). 
 255. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2009). 
 256. United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) , vacated in part by 593 
F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with the original three-judge panel that 
ruled United States v. Hill and its progeny should be overruled). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. 491 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 260. Id. at 1152. 
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court rejected the prosecution’s citation to pre-amendment authority:  
The government relies in part on our 1992 decision in United 
States v. Williams, 966 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1992), which 
identifies several factors to consider in applying the abuse of 
trust enhancement. That decision, however, predated the 
significant modifications in [Application Note One] that the 
United States Sentencing Commission adopted in 1993. . . . In 
light of the 1993 amendments, Williams is of limited 
significance when evaluating [§] 3B1.3.261 
As Spear implies, after the amendment, the circuit courts should have 
reevaluated their approaches to defining a position of trust.262 
However, three circuits have yet to analyze the amendment’s effect. 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit before Contreras and the Tenth Circuit before 
Spear, all three of those circuits rely on pre-amendment case law to justify 
their approaches. For example, in the Third Circuit’s first abuse of trust 
decision after the amendment, United States v. Pardo,263 the court failed to 
analyze critically the amendment’s changes. Instead of refocusing its 
analysis on the Commission’s guidance in the new amendment, the court 
emphasized its own pre-amendment case law:  
Culling these principles from our cases, it follows that in 
considering whether a position constitutes a position of trust 
for purposes of § 3B1.3, a court must consider: (1) whether 
the position allows the defendant to commit a difficult-to-
detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the position 
vests in defendant vis-a-vis [sic] the object of the wrongful 
act; and (3) whether there has been reliance on the integrity of 
the person occupying the position.264 
Despite the announcement of the Commission’s new definition just six 
months prior, Pardo relegates analysis of the amendment to one brief 
footnote and fails to use the amendment to redefine a position of trust.265 
Unfortunately, as the Third Circuit’s original interpretation of the 
amendment, Pardo stands as its precedential case. Thus, the Third 
Circuit’s § 3B1.3 jurisprudence relies on a decision that ignored the 
Commission’s definition of position of trust as announced in the 
amendment. 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 1154 n.2. Despite Spear, two 2008 Tenth Circuit abuse of trust cases reverted back 
to the hybrid approach. See United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008). Both cases prominently cited pre-amendment 
case law without explanation. See Gallant, 537 F.3d at 1244; Chee, 514 F.3d at 1118. 
 262. See Spear, 491 F.3d at 1154 n.2. 
 263. 25 F.3d 1187 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 264. Id. at 1192 (emphasis added). 
 265. See id. at 1191 & n.3. 
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The Second Circuit has also ignored the 1993 Amendment. In 1994, in 
its leading case, United States v. Viola,266 the court established the 
difficult-to-detect approach as an element in its own hybrid approach by 
citing its own pre-amendment case law.267 Similarly, in the Fourth 
Circuit’s leading abuse of trust case, United States v. Gordon,268 the court 
cited four different pre-amendment cases to establish its four-factor hybrid 
of (1) access and authority; (2) professional discretion; (3) difficult-to-
detect; and (4) culpability.269  
 As the cases above illustrate, all hybrid approaches presently in use 
originated from cases that preceded the amendment or failed to analyze its 
effect. Because the amendment significantly changed § 3B1.3’s position of 
trust definition, the hybrid approach sits on faulty legal ground. Thus, the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits should follow Contreras and Spear and 
abandon their hybrid approaches.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
By exclusively evaluating whether a defendant’s criminal opportunity 
arose as a result of substantial discretionary judgment given by the victim, 
the professional discretion approach best captures the will of the 
Commission in its 1993 Amendment. Since the amendment, most circuit 
courts have slowly adopted this approach to define a position of trust. In 
order to further promote Congress’s goal of reasonably uniform sentencing, 
the remaining courts should adopt the professional discretion approach for 
§ 3B1.3 sentencing.  
                                                                                                                     
 266. 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 267. Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 268. 61 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 269. Id. at 269 (citing United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir.1993); United 
States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925, 928–29 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904, 916 
(10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 505–06 (9th Cir. 1990)).  
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